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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been twenty years since researches gave up the right to patent the 
World Wide Web and made the source code publicly available.1  Since entering 
the public domain, the web has revolutionized the way people get information.  
Although electronic databases such as Westlaw and Lexis have been around since 
the 70s, they have been transformed to keep pace with developments on the web.  
Google searching has become so popular that electronic databases are now being 
redesigned to emulate Google.2  Consider the Google-like search boxes in 
WestlawNext and Lexis Advance. As a result of the web and increasingly 
sophisticated databases, attorneys today no longer need to sift through heaps of 
books at the library. They have virtual access to information anytime and 
anywhere.  
Law is a profession that is highly dependent on information.  The medium 
through which information is conveyed undoubtedly has effects on the way the 
law is understood. Where legal information once existed in a self-contained 
domain, today it can be found online amidst a universe of information.3 This 
change of access has raised some concerns.  Professor Ellie Margolis suggests 
that, without a print-based frame of reference, distinctions between legal and 
nonlegal information are becoming blurry and changing our common 
understanding of authority.4  In 2004, for example, the New York Times reported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jacob Goldstein, ‘The Single Most Valuable Document in the History of the World 
Wide Web’, NPR PLANET MONEY BLOG (May 1, 2013, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/05/01/180255276/the-single-most-valuable-
document-in-the-history-of-the-world-wide-web; Larry Magdid, Web Turns 20: Is It 
On Its Way Out?, FORBES (April 30, 2013, 2:44 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2013/04/30/web-turns-20-i-hope-its-not-on-
its-way-out/.   
2 Shawn G. Nevers, WestlawNext:Westlaw’s Next Generation Research System, 39 
STUDENT LAW. 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/student_lawyer/2010-
11/december/westlawnext_westlaws_nextgenerationresearchsystem.html.  
3 F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has 
Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 572 (2002) (“Another way that legal 
information-its management and transmission-reflects and contributes to the notion of 
‘the law’ as a distinct domain is in legal education.  Traditionally, law schools tended 
to keep aloof from other schools in the university.  Law schools usually have their 
own buildings.  The law library is separate from other university libraries and 
contains almost exclusively legal materials.  The segregation of students has been 
nearly total. . . . In my own institution at least, law courses are listed in a separate 
timetable and the law school even follows a different academic calendar from the rest 
of the university.”). 
4 Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the 
Delegalization of Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 911-12 (2013) [hereinafter 
Margolis, Authority Without Borders].  
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that more than 100 judicial opinions cited to Wikipedia.5  Will this be a new 
source of legal authority?  “The shift from print to electronic information 
technologies provides the law with a new environment, one that is less fixed, less 
structured, less stable and, consequently, more versatile and volatile.”6  As the 
legal community becomes increasingly reliant on the Internet for research, we will 
likely see a greater numbers of citations to a broader array of sources.   
This paper will explore the concept of “authority” in legal analyses by 
examining citation patterns of the Minnesota Supreme Court from 1992 and 2012.  
It will suggest that expansion of the web and electronic resources have made 
access to nonlegal information easier and that in turn, nonlegal materials are 
increasingly cited as authority in legal opinions.  This Paper will proceed in five 
parts.  Part II discusses the nature of primary, secondary, and nonlegal authority 
and examines concerns that technology may be blurring distinctions between 
them.  Part III describes the methodology used in the citation study and Part IV 
summarizes the results.  The use of nonlegal and interdisciplinary sources as 
authority will be addressed in Part V.  Lastly, Part VI concludes that nonlegal 
information can be valuable sources of authority. Rather than remaining tied to 
convention, future lawyers should be taught nonlegal research skills and the legal 
community should adopt guidelines about appropriate use of nonlegal authority.  
 
II. PRIMARY AUTHORITY, SECONDARY AUTHORITY, AND 
NONLEGAL AUTHORITY?  
 
“[T]he law’s practice of using and announcing its authorities—its 
citation practice—is part and parcel of law’s character. . . . 
[C]ontemporary controversies about citation practice turn out, 
therefore, to be controversies about authority, and as a result they are 
controversies about the nature of law itself.”7 
 
 Law is an authoritative practice.  “Anything which a court says or cites in 
its opinion, as leading to its decision in a given case, is authority of a kind, but the 
weight to be given it varies.”8  To better understand contemporary notions of 
authority, one can look to the citation practices of a court; and to fully appreciate 
how traditional authority is changing, it is important recognize our collective 
understanding of the meaning of authority.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Tina S. Ching, The Next Generation of Legal Citations: A Survey of Internet 
Citations in the Opinions of the Washington Supreme Court and Washington 
Appellate Courts, 1999-2005, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 387, 388 (2007) (citing 
Noam Cohen, Courts Turn to Wikipedia, but Selectively, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, 
at C3. 
6 Ethan Katsh, Law in A Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 
VILL. L. REV. 403, 406 (1993). 
7 Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1934 (2008). 
8 MILES O. PRICE & HARRY BITNER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 5 (3rd ed. 1969).  
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A fundamental principle of authority is that its force derives from its 
source rather than its content.9  A judicial opinion issued by a state supreme court, 
for example, is binding on all lower courts in that state, not because of the 
strength of legal reasoning but because of its origin.10  Legal authority is often 
classified as primary or secondary authority.  Primary materials can be mandatory 
or persuasive whereas secondary materials are only ever persuasive.  Judges are 
expected to comply with mandatory authority regardless of their own assessment 
or the outcome that it may have on a particular case.11  In contrast, judges have 
discretion to follow or cite to persuasive authority.  Thus, a court may rely on 
persuasive authority but is under no obligation to do so.12   
 
Occasionally, opinions reference nonlegal materials, which do not fall 
within the traditional framework of primary and secondary authority.  Nonlegal 
sources are being cited with greater frequency yet there are no clearly defined 
boundaries on how or when they should be used.13 
 
A. Traditional Authority 
 
1. Primary Authority 
 
The United States federal government and fifty autonomous state 
governments have legislative, executive, and judicial branches that, in essence, 
make law.14  The authoritative statements created by these governmental bodies 
are considered primary authority and include court opinions (case law), 
constitutions, legislation, rules of court, and the regulation and opinions of 
administrative agencies.15  Where a source of primary authority applies to a case, 
it is considered binding or mandatory, and the decisionmaker must follow it.16    
 
Constitutions are bodies of principles by which a state or nation governs 
itself.17  They give power to legislative bodies to enact statutes.18  A legislature 
can, in turn, grant power to administrative agencies to create rules and 
regulations.19  Courts are ultimately responsible for interpreting these sources of 
law and applying them to different fact patterns.  Precedent requires that a court’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Schauer, supra note 7, at 1935. 
10 Margolis, Authority Without Borders, supra note 4, at 914. 
11 Schauer, supra note 7, at 1937. 
12 Id. 
13 Margolis, Authority Without Borders, supra note 4, at 944. 
14 STEVEN BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 1 (9th edition 2009).  
15 Id. at 2. 
16 Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and 
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 793 (1981). 
17 BARKAN, supra note 14, at 7. 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 Id. at 7. 
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interpretation of law be applied to subsequent cases.20  Judicial precedent is a 
court decision that “furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar 
facts or issues.”21  Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts must adhere to 
applicable precedent.  This means that when a point of law has been decided, it 
will no longer be considered by the same court, or by those that are bound to 
follow it.22  Lower courts follow decisions of higher courts in the same 
jurisdiction and courts follow their own prior decisions unless there is some 
compelling reason not to do so.  The doctrine of precedent encourages 
predictability, efficiency, and fairness in that similar cases will reach similar 
results.23   
 
2. Secondary Authority 
 
Secondary authority has not always been viewed as authoritative.  In the 
early 1900s, secondary sources were negatively perceived as shortcuts to the law 
and were deemed to lack the integrity of primary authority.24  As prominent 
figures in the legal community voiced support for secondary authority, however, 
it eventually began creeping into judicial opinions.25  Between 1900 and 1978, 
citations to secondary authority by the United States Supreme Court rose by a 
whopping 1,635% per case.26  
 
Secondary authority is generally used to interpret, explain, or develop 
primary authority.27  It includes legal periodicals, treatises, legal dictionaries, 
legal encyclopedias, legislative histories, and restatements, among others.  Judges 
might turn to secondary sources when confronted with ambiguous or emerging 
areas in the law or when they need more context.28  
 
B. Nonlegal Authority 
 
  “[N]onlegal authority is information that is not explicitly ‘about the law’ 
and not directed at a legal audience but that is nonetheless used as authority in 
support of legal analysis.”29  While citations to cases, statutes, and regulations 
remain the bread and butter of judicial opinions, there is concern that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Id. at 8. 
21 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
22 Id. (citing WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 
321 (3d ed. 1914)). 
23 BARKAN, supra note 14, at 6.  
24 Joseph E. Brooks, Jurisprudence: The "New Haven School" and the Emergence of 
Secondary Authority-Is Number Two Trying Harder?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 1031, 1042 
(1989). 
25 Id. at 1043. 
26 Id. 
27 BARKAN, supra note 14, at 2. 
28 Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 793. 
29 Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders, supra note 4, at 919. 
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distinctions between traditional and nonlegal sources are becoming less apparent 
as nonlegal sources are cited with greater frequency.30  According to Lawrence 
Friedman, this trend “may be nothing more than a stylistic shift or it may be a real 
movement in the direction of more substantive rationality.”31  
 
Because judicial citations reflect what judges view as legitimate and 
authoritative, a rise in citations to nonlegal sources has raised concerns about 
judicial reasoning and about the world of legal information as a whole.32  
Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise posit that traditional canons of legal 
information are beginning to wane as nonlegal sources are increasingly cited as 
acceptable authority.33  They refer to this theory as the “delegalization” of law.34   
 
There is no single cause for the increase in nonlegal citations.  Lawrence 
Friedman suggests that multiple factors such as changes in judicial workload, 
greater reliance on law clerks or librarians, and substantive claims of the parties 
could influence citation practices.35  Scholars suggest that competition and 
conglomeration in the publishing industry36 and the emergence of online 
resources have attributed to this development.37  
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
This study examines the citation practices of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court.  Minnesota was chosen because there have been few recent studies on state 
court citation practices and because the court has traditionally “maintain[ed] a 
centrist, slightly populist-progressive approach to government . . .”38 
“Minnesotans have traditionally prided themselves on being progressive, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Id. at 911. 
31 Lawrence M. Friedman, Taking Law and Society Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
529, 535-36 (1999). 
32 John Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427, 457 (2002). 
33 Frederick Schauer & Virginia Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization 
of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 495 (2000). 
34 Id. 
35 Lawrence M. Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 794-95. 
36 Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and The Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2000). 
37 Schauer & Wise, supra note 33, at 1108; Michael Whiteman, The Death of 
Twentieth-Century Authority, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 27, 30 (2010). 
38 Bill Salisbury, Minnesota: Supreme Court Justice Anderson Will Retire in May, 
PIONEER PRESS (Jan. 4, 2013, 7:19 PM), 
http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_22312301/mark-dayton-looks-next-
minnesota-supreme-court-pick (quoting Justice Paul Anderson of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court).  
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practical and predictable”39 as well.  While the Minnesota Supreme Court may not 
be the first to start citation trends, it would not be the last to follow them either.  
Because the court is neither on the bleeding edge nor traditional, it offers a telling 
look at how citation patterns in judicial opinions have changed over the last 20 
years.  This study looked at opinions published during the years 1992 and 2012.  
These years are significant because 1992 predates access to the World Wide Web, 
which became publicly available in 199340; and 2012 provides a current 
assessment of the Court’s citation practices. 
 
I developed the methodology for this study by examining a body of 
existing citation studies.41  This study analyzes citations to primary and secondary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 
10,000 Lakes: Minnesota's Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the 
United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 867 (2007) 
40 Goldstein, supra note 1. 
41 See, e.g., Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: 
Appellate Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 417 (2002); A. 
Michael Beaird, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate Courts, 1950-2000, 
25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 301 (2003); Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court 
and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Mary Anne 
Bobinski, Citation Sources and the New York Court of Appeals, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 965 
(1985); Tina S. Ching, The Next Generation of Legal Citations: A Survey of Internet 
Citations in the Opinions of the Washington Supreme Court and Washington 
Appellate Courts, 1999-2005, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 387 (2007); Wes Daniels, 
“Far Beyond the Law Reports”: Secondary Source Citations in United States 
Supreme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 L. LIB. J. 1 (1983); 
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal 
Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427 (2002); Paul Hellyer, 
Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of California 
Supreme Court Opinions, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 285 (2005); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 
249 (1977); James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate 
Decisions Published in 1990, 86 LAW. LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Richard A. Mann, The 
North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 39 (1979); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of 
Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); William H. Manz, The Citation 
Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 
1273 (2001); William Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A 
Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002); John H. Merryman, Toward a 
Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California 
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Frederick 
Schauer & Virginia Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 495 (2000); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 U. MO. 
KANSAS CITY L. REV. 228 (1964); Louis J. Sirico & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing 
of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 
134 (1986); Louis J. Sirico & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the 
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sources and to non-legal sources.  For the purposes of this study, primary sources 
include judicial opinions and administrative decisions. The study counts majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions separately.  Several types of opinions were 
not reviewed for the purposes of this study including unpublished opinions, per 
curiam opinions, bench memos, opinions shorter than one page in length, and 
opinions of original actions such as extraordinary writs and governance of the 
bar.42  Citations to constitutions, statutes, and regulations were not included in the 
study as they are more often the topic of dispute rather than the authority cited to 
resolve a case.43 As one scholar noted, “If a statute is relevant to the case, the 
opinion writer has little choice but to cite it.”44   
 
Secondary legal sources include treatises, legislative history, legal 
encyclopedias, legal dictionaries, legal periodicals, American Law Reports, 
Restatements, model codes, sentencing guidelines, and miscellaneous legal 
resources.  Secondary “nonlegal authority is information that is not explicitly 
‘about the law’ and not directed at a legal audience but that is nonetheless used as 
authority in support of legal analysis.”45  It includes such things as general interest 
newspapers, magazines, and web sites as well as academic and nonacademic 
materials.  In the relatively few cases where it was unclear about whether a title 
should be categorized as legal or nonlegal, the study adopted a strategy employed 
by John Hasko using the Library of Congress Classification scheme.46  For close 
calls, I searched the University of Washington’s Gallagher Law Library catalog.  
Those that fell within Class K or any of its subclasses were treated as legal 
material.47  For example, the title Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States is somewhat law-related but it falls under Class H.48  Therefore it was 
counted as nonlegal material. 
 
Using these guidelines, I manually examined 88 Minnesota Supreme 
Court cases from 2012 and 100 Minnesota Supreme Court cases from 1992.  I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
United States Court of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 
(1991); George R. Smith, The Current Opinions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1 
ARK. L. REV. 89 (1947); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana 
Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996).  
42 Friedman et al, supra note 16, at 779 (explaining that these types of opinions were 
excluded because the study “wished to focus on those cases the SSCs themselves 
regarded as of some significance.”).  
43 Beaird, supra note 41, at 304-05. 
44 Id.  
45 Ellie Margolis, supra note 4, at 919. 
46 Hasko, supra note 32, at 430. 
47 Id. 
48 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nlj/grants/228091.pdf; See the record in the 
GALLAGHER LAW LIBRARY CATALOG, 
http://marian.law.washington.edu/record=b1227184~S0.  
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also used Westlaw’s Table of Authorities to verify citations to cases cited in each 
opinion.  I noted the nature of the underlying dispute, the occurrence of 
concurring and dissenting opinions, and the authorities cited in each opinion.  A 
source cited multiple times in the same opinion by the same Justice was counted 
only once, the first time that it appeared in the opinion, concurrence, or dissent.49  
Citations appearing in footnotes and string citations were also counted.  Case 
citations referring to the procedural history of an opinion were not counted 
because they are not cited for authoritative purposes.    
 
Due to the relatively small scope of this study, a number of topics are not 
addressed.  The study does not count references to sources that are not explicitly 
cited in an opinion.  Thus, the extent to which the Court relies on certain types of 
authority may be greater than the data suggests.  Further, the study does not 
include citations to various types of primary authority; therefore it is impossible to 
determine the citation frequency of a particular source in comparison with the 
overall number of citations.  While the study is subject to human error, about 25% 
of the cases were reread to test for accuracy in the citations coding.  Although the 
representative sample of cases studied was relatively small, there were 







           Table 1 pictured above shows the number and types of opinions that were 
analyzed for this study.  The Minnesota Supreme Court wrote 331 opinions in 
1992 and 155 opinions in 2012.  Unpublished opinions, per curiam opinions, 
opinions shorter than one page in length, and opinions of original actions were 
excluded from this study.  This left over 200 remaining opinions from 1992 and 
only 88 from 2012.  Data in this study is derived from majority, dissenting and 
concurring opinions.  Partial concurrences and dissents are counted as both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 John Hasko, supra note 32, at 431. 
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concurring and dissenting opinions.  Due to time limitations, I examined only the 
last 100 published decisions from 1992.  This included 20 dissenting and 6 
concurring opinions.   I reviewed the 88 opinions from 2012, which included 37 
dissents and 15 concurrences.  One of the most notable changes is the increase in 
the number of dissenting opinions, nearly doubling in the last twenty years.  
Roughly 20% of cases examined from 1992 include dissenting opinions, 
compared to nearly 42% of the cases examined in 2012.  Former Justice Esther 
Tomljanovich had the greatest number of dissenting opinions in 1992, with 6 
dissents.  Justice Alan Page surpassed that number in 2012 with 11 dissents.50  
Although this study is a mere representative sample of published cases, it suggests 
that dissenting opinions of the Minnesota Supreme Court have more than doubled 
over the last twenty years.    
 The rise in dissenting opinions supports findings of previous studies.  
Where dissenting opinions were once criticized for undercutting predictability and 
legitimacy in courts, today justices appear more willing to dissent.51  One citation 
study looked at citation practices of 16 State Supreme Courts between 1870 and 
1970 and found that the number of dissenting opinions gradually increased from 
6.4% in 1900-1910 to 12.8% in 1960-1970.52  The study found that cases deemed 
important had a higher dissent rate.53  Since most states now have intermediary 
appellate courts and have discretion to select the most important cases, it is not 
surprising that the number of dissenting opinions is increasing.54  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  	  	  
1992 Authors of  
Concurring & Dissenting Opinions 
 2012 Authors of 
Concurring & Dissenting Opinions 
Justices Dissent Concurrence  Justices Dissent Concurrence 
Rosalie Wahl 2   Lorie Skjerven 
Gildea   
2 1 
John Simonett 2 3  Alan Page 11  
M. Jeanne 
Coyne  
1 1  Barry Anderson  2 
Alexander 
Keith 
   Paul Anderson 6 4 
Esther 
Tomljanovich  
6 1  Christopher 
Dietzen 
5  2 
1992 Authors of  
Concurring & Dissenting Opinions 
 2012 Authors of 
Concurring & Dissenting Opinions 
Sandra 
Gardebring 
5   David Stras 7 4 
Lawrence 
Yetka 
4 1  Helen Meyer  6 2 
    Wilhema Wright    
	  	  
51 Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 785-86. 
52 Id. at 787. 
53 Id. at 787-88.	  	  
54 Id. at 788 (discussing a study which found a strong correlation between court 
discretion in selecting cases and dissenting opinions). 
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   As is evident from Table 2, the Minnesota Supreme Court cites more cases 
today in its majority opinions than it did twenty years ago.55  Case citations 
account for the bulk of authorities cited by the Court.  In 1992, the Court cited to 
1,000 cases in their majority opinions; and in 2012, that number rose to 1,838 
cases.  The 2012 Court cited in-state and federal cases more frequently than the 
1992 Court, however, there has been a slight decrease in the number of out-of-
state opinions cited.  This overall increase in citations to judicial opinions could 
be the result of various factors such as improved access to caselaw, more complex 
cases, lengthier opinions, judicial workload, increased numbers of mandatory 
cases, or perhaps to more string citations.  Some studies suggest that dissenting 
opinions also increase the overall number of citations because they indicate more 
controversial cases that require more authority.56 
  The majority of cases cited in 1992 and 2012 were to Minnesota opinions.  
Most state high courts prefer to cite instate opinions.57  In 1992, 646 or roughly 
65% of the judicial opinions cited were to in-state cases.  In 2012, the number of 




1992 Total Number of Citations  
to Judicial Opinions 
 2012 Total Number of Citations  
to Judicial Opinions 
 MN State Federal U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
  MN State Federal U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
Majority 646 109 90 155  Majority 1,348 89 146 255 
Dissent 69 23 10 33  Dissent 361 36 64 144 
Concurrence 13 9 4 4  Concurrence 68 7 6 18 
	  
56 William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-
1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121, 126 (1995). 
57 Id. at 127. 
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in-state cases cited more than doubled to 1,348 cases.  In spite of this increase, the 
2012 in-state cases comprise only a slightly larger proportion of the total number 
of citations at 73%.  
 The number of citations to federal cases is increasing but not in proportion 
to the increase of cases cited overall.  In 1992, the Court cited 245 federal cases; 
155 of these were to the United States Supreme Court and 90 were to lower 
federal courts.  Federal cases made up 25% of all the cases cited in 1992.  Today, 
the number of citations to federal opinions is increasing.  In 2012, there were 401 
citations to federal opinions.  While the overall ratio of federal opinions has 
dropped to roughly 13%, the number continues to increase.  This increase 
correlates to an increased number of criminal cases that invoke federal laws, 
which have been interpreted at the federal level.58 
 Citations to other state opinions have dropped slightly from 11% in 1992 
to 5% in 2012. Due to the growth and preference for in-state citations, there are 
fewer occasions for courts to look at out-of-state cases. 
59
 
 Not only have the number of citations to judicial opinions generally 
increased over the last twenty years, the number of citations to more recent 
opinions has also increased.  In 1992, the Court cited to 553 cases published 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Id. at 129. 
59	  	  



















Majority 66 487 447  Majority 151 745 942 
Dissent 5 60 70  Dissent 41 183 381 
Concurrence 0 15 15  Concurrence 8 16 75 
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between 1980 and 1992.  In comparison, the 2012 Court cited to 896 judicial 
opinions published between 2000 and 2012.  The study shows that the Court is 
citing to more recent judicial opinions with greater frequency.  In both 1992 and 
2012, however, citations to more recent judicial opinions comprise roughly half of 
all the case citations.60 
 
 This study also examined citations to secondary legal and nonlegal 
authority.61  As Table 4 shows, the numbers of citations to sources such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The percentage of case citations to newer opinions has remained relatively 
consistent with 54% in 1992 and 49% in 2012.   
61	  	  
                             1992 Citations Secondary &  
                             Nonlegal Authority 
 2012 Citations Secondary &  
Nonlegal Authority 
 Majority Dissent Concurrence  Majority Dissent Concurrence 
Legislative 
History 
10 1 1  5 1 0 
ALR 3 1 0  2 0 0 
Treatise 23 4 2  19 11 1 
Legal 
Periodical 
34 6 1  11 34 0 
Legal 
Encyclopedia 
3 0 0  4 0 0 
Legal 
Dictionary 
1 0 0  17 6 0 
Restatements 6 2 0  9 2 0 
Miscellaneous 
Legal 
7 0 0  24 6 0 
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legislative history, American Law Reports, treatises, legal encyclopedias, and 
restatements, have changed little over the last twenty years.  Therefore, I will 
touch on a few these sources briefly.  In 1992, the most commonly cited treatises 
were Search and Seizure, Substantive Criminal Law, and The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation.62 The most commonly cited treatises in 2012 include The Law of 
Torts, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, and once again, Substantive 
Criminal Law.63  While there were very few citations to encyclopedias or to 
restatements, American Jurisprudence and Restatement (Second) of Torts were 
the most frequently cited in both 1992 and 2012.   
 
There have also been some notable changes.  Citations to legal periodicals 
in majority opinions have declined from 36 in 1992 to 11 in 2012.  The most 
commonly cited journals in 1992 were general law reviews and included 
Columbia Law Review, Minnesota Law Review, and William Mitchell Law 
Review.  In 2012, there were no oft-cited journals.  Interestingly, citations to 
periodicals in dissenting opinions have dramatically increased from 5 in 1992 to 
34 in 2012.  Twenty-eight of the 34 periodicals cited, however, are from two 
dissenting opinions written by Justice Meyer.   
 
There has been a sharp increase in citations to legal dictionaries from 1 in 
1992 to 19 in 2012.  The most frequently cited is Black’s Law Dictionary.  There 
are also citations to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, A Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage, and to a specialized legal dictionary, Schmidt’s Attorneys’ Dictionary of 
Medicine.   
 
 The number of citations to miscellaneous legal citations has also 
increased.  This could be due various factors such as a proliferation of resources 
or to improved online access to legal information.  The most commonly cited 
resource in this category was the Minnesota Practice Series.   
  
  Finally, the results show a growing number of citations to nonlegal 
sources from 11 in 1992 to 36 in 2012.  Nonlegal citations made up over 25% of 
the all of the citations to secondary authority in 2012.   While the majority of 
nonlegal citations were to dictionaries such as Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, and American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language, there were also citations to nonlegal 
journals, web sites, and books.  Historically, there have been relatively few 
citations to nonlegal sources.  A case citation study of sixteen State Supreme 
Courts from 1940-1970 concluded:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (2D ED. 1987); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & 
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW (1986); ARTHUR LARSON, THE 
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1990). 
63 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2000); PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS (W.P. KEETON ET AL. EDS., 5TH ED.1984); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW (2D ED. 2003). 
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[O]ne might well have guessed that, over the years, citation patterns would 
broaden considerably, that judges would pay more attention to social 
science, and that they would take in a wider range of premises and more 
diverse knowledge as food for decisionmaking. . . . Our data, however, 
suggest that while the judges may be absorbing broad learning at the 
present time, any such learning is hardly reflected in citation patterns.  
This rarity is reflected by the great fuss which was made over one footnote 
in Brown v. Board of Education which cited, in support of the decision, a 
number of social science studies.  Whether the readings cited actually 
influenced the outcome is very doubtful.  In any event, SSCs rarely go 
outside the law for authority.  Social science, economic, or technical 
studies were cited in only 0.6% of the 1940-1970 SSC cases.64  
 
 As citation studies at the federal level and more recently at the state level 
suggest, the increase in citations to nonlegal materials is growing steadily.  
 
 
V. ANALYSIS: DELEGALIZATION 
   
  The most notable findings of this study are the increasing numbers of 
dissenting opinions and citations to nonlegal materials.  Studies have long 
confirmed that dissent rates are gradually creeping upward, especially since states 
established intermediary appellate courts.65  Conversely, citation studies of state 
supreme courts from 1970 and 1990 found very few citations to nonlegal 
sources.66  The trend toward nonlegal citations has been emerging gradually over 
the last two decades.  Therefore this analysis will focus on this more recent trend 
of court citations to nonlegal sources.   
 The rise in citations to nonlegal or nontraditional authorities in judicial 
opinions raises concerns about judicial reasoning and the weakening of traditional 
legal authority.  While citations to cases, statutes, and regulations remain central 
to judicial opinions, an increase in citations to nonlegal authority may be blurring 
the distinctions between the authoritativeness of sources.  “[T]he law's practice of 
using and announcing its authorities--its citation practice-- is part and parcel of 
law's character.  The various contemporary controversies about citation practice 
turn out, therefore, to be controversies about authority, and as a result they are 
controversies about the nature of law itself.”67  Concerns regarding citations to 
nonlegal authority therefore warrant further examination.  This analysis will 
explore some of these concerns and look at various causes contributing to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 816-17 (study including the Minnesota Supreme 
Court). 	  
65 Id. at 787. 
66 Id. at 816-17.; James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio 
Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 129 (1994).  
67 Frederick Schauer, supra note 7, at 1934-35. 
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increase in nonlegal citations.  Lastly, it suggests that nonlegal authority is 
increasingly valued in the legal profession and that future attorneys should be 
prepared to do nonlegal research.  
A. Endorsement of Nonlegal Resources by Courts 
 
 “[L]aw, itself an authority-soaked practice, had traditionally drawn 
a distinction between good and bad authority, privileged and 
nonprivileged authority, and authorities that rank higher or lower 
in the hierarchy of authorities. Just as a recent decision of the 
highest court within the same jurisdiction as the deciding court 
ranks at or near the top of this hierarchy, so too are authorities 
outside of the traditional legal canon traditionally understood to be 
at or even below the bottom of the hierarchy of acceptable 
authority. But legal authority norms are clearly in flux.”68 
 
 The emerging presence of nonlegal sources in judicial opinions became 
readily apparent in federal court opinions in the early 1990s.  A Federal Courts 
Study Committee, appointed in 1990, noted that federal court litigation was 
becoming increasingly complex and that nonlegal information from a variety of 
disciplines was becoming more important.69  Since then, the increasing use of 
nonlegal sources by the United States Supreme Court has been well documented.  
One study of Supreme Court citations from 1989 to 1998 found that nonlegal 
materials were cited in 40% of signed opinions.70  Another Supreme Court 
citation study from 1950 to 1998 found a substantial increase in the frequency of 
nonlegal citations beginning in the early 90s, and noted that the types of nonlegal 
sources cited varied greatly.71 
 
Citation studies confirm that the use of nonlegal sources in Supreme Court 
judicial opinions is increasing.72  Although courts can be slow to change, this 
study of Minnesota Supreme Court opinions confirms that this trend may also be 
occurring on the state level.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine why judges 
turn to nonlegal authority and what effects this might have on traditional canons 
of law.   
 
Judges cite to authority that they feel bound to or that they regard as useful 
in resolving a legal issue.73  Citations to nonlegal sources serve a variety of 
purposes: “(1) in the form of background assumptions about such matters as what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Randy Diamond, Advancing Public Interest Practitioner Research Skills in Legal 
Education, 7 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 67, 90 (2005). 
69 Hasko, supra note 32, at 428. 
70 Id. at 430. 
71 Schauer & Wise, supra note 33, at 502. 
72James G. Milles, Leaky Boundaries and the Decline of the Autonomous Law School 
Library, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 387, 409-10 (2004).  
73 Leonard, supra note 66, at 129.  
	   16	  
motivates human behavior; (2) ‘clarificatory or heuristic,’ i.e., using theories from 
philosophy, economics, or political science to suggest what law would result from 
application of such theories; (3) ‘motivational,’ or ‘to provide a reason to decide a 
case in a particular way,’ such as to promote economic efficiency; or (4) to justify 
or legitimate decisions reached on other bases.”74 Further, traditional legal writing 
prefers some source of authority to none.75 
 
A citation to a new source in a judicial opinion legitimizes that source as 
an acceptable authority.76  As John Merryman suggests, “citation by a court, in the 
public mind, puts the stamp of judicial approval on the work.”77  As nonlegal 
sources are increasingly cited, they are “changing the face of judicial opinions and 
possibly the law itself.”78  Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise posit that 
decreased costs and ease of access to information online have spurred the 
increased use of nonlegal authorities in judicial opinions.79  They believe that this 
trend signifies a change in what courts deem acceptable authority and weakens the 
dominance of traditional authority.80  They refer to this concept as the 
“delegalization” of law.81   
 
B. From Print-Based to Online Research 
 
“Where we once researched in a set of common textbooks, most notably 
the digests, we now search the universe of information. Its effect on our  
context is marked.”82   
 
Prior to the emergence of the Internet and electronic resources, the world 
of legal research was contained in “accepted textbooks of the field” such as 
treatises, encyclopedias, law review articles, codes, and digests.83  Law was 
treated as a distinct domain grounded in a definable body of information.  Over 
the last several decades, however, the world of legal information has changed 
dramatically.  Today, most legal practitioners do their research online and have 
access to an infinite amount of information.84  More resources are being produced 
digitally, and lawyers and judges are turning to the Internet to conduct their 
research.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Milles, supra note 72, at 409-10. 
75 Margolis, Authority Without Borders, supra note 4, at 921. 
76 Whiteman, supra note 37, at 41-2. 
77 John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority What the California Supreme 
Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 616 (1954). 
78 Margolis, Authority Without Borders, supra note 4, at 911-12. 
79 Schauer & Wise, supra note 33 at 495.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Barbara Blintliff, Context and Legal Research, in LEGAL INFORMATION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 79, 89 (Richard A. Danner & Frank G. Houdek eds. 2008).  
83 Id. at 90. 
84 Id. at 82. 
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Some scholars suggest that the shift from print-based to online research 
has affected the nature of legal authority,85 effectively relaxing the boundaries 
between primary, secondary, and nonlegal sources.86  Rather than searching 
through law books or sorting through indexes where everything has been 
hierarchically arranged, practitioners can now do keyword searches to access a 
universe of legal and nonlegal information.87   Improved access to information 
“feeds the trend toward interdisciplinary studies”88 and toward delegazation.  The 
proximity of information available on the web makes the distinction between law 
and nonlaw sources less palpable.89  Many scholars agree that the medium 
through which information is conveyed has a substantial impact on how people 
understand the information.90  Medium theory, for example, suggests that 
mediums are not neutral in communicating information and it “support[s] the idea 
that changing the medium through which legal researchers encounter the law will 
impact their understanding and practice of law.”91 
 
While the increase in citations to nonlegal sources raises concerns 
regarding the authenticity, credibility, and permanence of information, there are 
also some benefits to this trend.  It allows judges and practitioners to refer to a 
wider base of authority and supports the notion that the law does not exist in a 
vacuum.92  As Professor Ellie Margolis states:  
 
Used as authority, nonlegal information can play a valuable role in  
advancing legal reasoning, particularly in cases of first impression, first-
time statutory interpretation, and constitutional litigation.  Lawyers can 
rely on this kind of information to help judges understand the real-world 
context and implications of legal arguments in our complex and fast 
changing world. Judges relying on electronic information can establish the 
relevance and credibility of judicial opinions.  Since the reality of today’s 
society is that the majority of information is accessed online, the legal 
profession will seem increasingly anachronistic if it continues to resist 
reliance on Internet sources.93 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders, supra note 4, at 923. 
86 Hanson, supra note 3, at 584-85. 
87 Blintliff, supra note 82, at 80. 
88 Hanson, supra note 3, at 587. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 586. 
91 Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
223, 229 (2008). 
92 See, e.g., Mary Whisner, Researching Outside the Box, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 467, 472 
(2003) (explaining the various ways in which practitioners benefit from the resources 
of other disciplines).  
93 Ellie Margolis, It's Time to Embrace the New-Untangling the Uses of Electronic 
Sources in Legal Writing, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 191, 218 (2013) [hereinafter 
Margolis, It’s Time to Embrace the New]. 
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C. Preparing Practice-Ready Students: Nonlegal Research   
 
  Internet research is here to stay.  As digital natives enter the legal field, 
reliance on electronic information will continue to grow and citations to nonlegal 
sources can be expected to increase.  Nontraditional sources can play a valuable 
role in advancing legal reasoning but they can also raise issues of authenticity, 
credibility and permanence.  Therefore, it is important that future lawyers not only 
learn how to do nonlegal research but also learn how to discern the quality of 
nonlegal sources.  
 
It is becoming an asset in the legal field to have expertise and research 
skills outside the area of law.94  Courts are regularly looking to disciplines such as 
economics, political science, psychology, and sociology for support,95and 
attorneys, law librarians, and law clerks are routinely required to do nonlegal 
research.96  Today’s practitioner cannot afford to ignore it. In areas of complex 
litigation, the ability to conduct interdisciplinary and nonlegal research lends 
distinct advantages.  Nonlegal sources can bolster legal reasoning, lend support to 
emerging areas of the law, and put information into context.  They can also 
provide information about decisionmakers, stakeholders, and parties.97  “Judges, 
prosecutors, and other government officials do not make decisions in a vacuum; 
advanced researchers dig deeper to find out information about what makes these 
individuals tick.”98 
  
As citation studies indicate, nonlegal sources are becoming increasingly 
valued in law, which means that today’s law students should be prepared to do 
different types of research.  With the proliferation of online resources, students 
also have the added burden of determining what sources are credible and 
authentic.  Therefore, it is incredibly important that students have training in 
nonlegal research and in information literacy.99  With the world of information at 
their fingertips, students must learn to be critical evaluators of information and 
must be able to discern what is relevant and credible.100  Information literacy is 
becoming increasingly important as more information is made freely accessible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Diamond, supra note 68, at 89. 
95 Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 308 (2005) (discussing specific cases that support notion 
that courts increasingly rely on certain disciplines).   
96 Sarah Valentine, Legal Research As A Fundamental Skill: A Lifeboat for Students 
and Law Schools, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (2010); Hanson, supra note 3, at 
587. 
97 Diamond, supra note 68, at 91 (2005) (citing Thomas Michael McDonnell, Playing 
Beyond the Rules, A Realist and Rhetoric-Based Approach to Researching the Law 
and Solving Client Problems, 67 UMKC L. REV. 285 (1998)).  
98 Id. at 93 (2005). 
99 Heise, supra note 95, at 313. 
100 Valentine, supra note 96, at 174-75. 
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online and practitioners move away from fee-based legal databases.101  While it is 
doubtlessly impossible to provide law students with in-depth nonlegal research 
training, students can learn some general nonlegal research skills, which they can 
later build on in their careers.102  
 
Law schools have a responsibility to their students to ensure that they are 
practice ready for a field that is increasingly relying on nonlegal and 
interdisciplinary research.  This responsibility has not escaped attention.  Law 
schools have begun introducing nonlegal and interdisciplinary research as part of 
the curriculum.  In 2006, for example, Stanford Law School announced a new 
“3D” JD program, to provide students with an interdisciplinary education beyond 
the typical law school curriculum.  According to the school, this change was 
instituted to address the increasingly complex and interdisciplinary nature of law. 
“To serve clients capably or address major social and political issues, lawyers 
now must work in cross-disciplinary/cross-professional teams, particularly given 
that they work in increasingly sophisticated industries and fields—engineering, 
medicine, biotech, the environment.”103  Today, an increasing number of law 
schools offer interdisciplinary learning through joint degree programs and 
specialized classes.104  Topics such as business research, health, medicine, and 
social policy are being added to advanced legal research courses.105  Rather than 
simply offering optional courses, law schools should consider adding nonlegal 
research into substantive courses or making it a required part of the curriculum.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
New technology has made legal research vastly different.  Today, judges 
and practitioners use mobile apps, web sites, and databases for their research and 
print collections are slowly dwindling.  The shift from print to online research is 
subtly impressing upon our collective notion of the meaning of authority.  The 
law is no longer physically isolated but exists within a universe of information.  
Judges are not only finding the law online, but a lot of other valuable information 
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102 Id. 
103 Press Release, Stan. L. School, A “3D” JD: Stanford Law School Announces New 
Model for Legal Education (Nov. 28 2006), available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/node/249456.  
104 A quick Google search shows that many law schools offer interdisciplinary 
training.  See, e.g., Interdisciplinary Education, U. CHI. L. SCH., 
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as well.  The resolution of cases and the development of specialized areas of the 
law increasingly depend on nonlegal information.  Judges, and in turn 
practitioners, are routinely departing from traditional sources of legal authority to 
support legal reasoning.  To better prepare students to compete in a field where 
nonlegal research is becoming more important, law schools should develop 
curriculum to teach students some basic nonlegal research skills that they can 
build upon later in their careers.  As the trend toward nonlegal citations continues, 
it may also be time to establish some guidelines about when and what sorts of 
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